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Fighting Words Today
R. George Wright*

Abstract
For some time, the familiar free speech exception known as the
“fighting words” doctrine has been subject to severe judicial and
scholarly critique. It turns out, though, that the fighting words doctrine, in general, is neither obsolete nor in need of radical limitation.
The traditionally neglected “inflict injury” prong of the fighting
words doctrine can and should be vitalized, with only a minimal
loss, if not an actual net gain, in promoting the basic purposes of
freedom of speech in the first place. And the “reactive violence”
prong can and should be relieved of its historic biases and dubious
assumptions. On that basis, “reactive violence” prong cases can be
more thoughtfully and realistically adjudicated.
In all fighting words cases, judicial attention should be paid to
the distinction between the abusive or provocative words actually
used by the defendant speaker and any underlying message, including the underlying message’s naturally associated emotional fervency. Protecting the latter, in undistorted fashion, need not mean
protecting the former. In most fighting words cases, any tradeoff
between the value of minimal discursive civility and the values underlying freedom of undistorted speech need not be substantial.

* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The “fighting words” doctrine reflects the idea that words in context can
be so provocative, so deeply offensive, or so damaging to a targeted listener
as to lose free speech protection. The current status of this idea is, however,
deeply unclear.1 It has recently been observed that “[f]ighting words doctrine
is controversial both with respect to its breadth and even to whether it is still
a live doctrine.”2 Thus, the fighting words doctrine “remains a persistent
source of constitutional confusion.”3 There is, certainly, no shortage of recent
fighting words cases at levels below the Supreme Court pointing in various
directions.4
This Article seeks to survey, clarify, and encourage the reform of the
fighting words doctrine.5 The Article first presents the relevant Supreme
Court case law, along with a number of the standard assumptions embodied
in the fighting words case law.6 The Article then examines the widespread
tendency to broadly limit, if not abolish, the fighting words doctrine.7 The
problem of reconciling fighting words doctrine with the value of protecting
freedom of speech is then addressed.8
As it turns out, a focus on the value of speech and its costs has importantly
different implications as between the two classically recognized types of
fighting words.9 Attention to both the nature and gravity of particularized
speech-injuries and to the optimization of free speech values suggests that the
fighting words doctrine should be strongly vitalized in some important kinds
of cases and more sensibly reconceived in others.10

1. See, e.g., Burton Caine, The Trouble with “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
Is a Threat to First Amendment Values and Should Be Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 445 (2004)
(asserting that the “fighting words doctrine was ill conceived, is in disarray, and poses a potent danger
to speech that should command premier protection”).
2. Mark P. Strasser, Those Are Fighting Words, Aren’t They? On Adding Injury to Insult, 71 CASE
W. RSRV. L. REV. 249, 250 (2020) (footnotes omitted).
3. Robert M. O’Neil, Hate Speech, Fighting Words, and Beyond—Why American Law Is Unique,
76 ALB. L. REV. 467, 472 (2012) (footnote omitted).
4. See generally David L. Hudson, Jr., Essay, The Fighting Words Doctrine: Alive and Well in
the Lower Courts, 19 U.N.H. L. REV. 1 (2020) (showing that the fighting words doctrine remains
frequently litigated in the lower courts).
5. See infra Parts III, V.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Parts IV, V.
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II. CHAPLINSKY V. NEW HAMPSHIRE AND SOME INITIAL COMPLICATIONS
For good or ill, the fighting words doctrine has a single primary source in
the case law.11 This primary source is the World War II era case of Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire.12 This is not to suggest that the Chaplinsky fighting words
doctrine was entirely a novel innovation.13 In fact, much of the logic underlying Chaplinsky was anticipated in the then-recent case of Cantwell v. Connecticut,14 as Chaplinsky itself acknowledged.15
Thus, Chaplinsky quotes the Cantwell case for the foundational claim that
“[r]esort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument.”16
Expanding upon the Cantwell language, the Court in Chaplinsky declared that
some utterances “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”17
The Chaplinsky Court, writing prior to the free speech constitutional revolutions in obscenity,18 profanity,19 and defamation,20 determined that “[t]here
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any [c]onstitutional
problem.”21 Into this class of supposedly well-defined and narrow exceptions
11. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (establishing the fighting
words doctrine).
12. See id.; see also Strasser, supra note 2, at 252–58 (tracing the fighting words doctrine back to
Chaplinsky); Hudson, Jr., supra note 4, at 3 (noting that the “Supreme Court created” the fighting
words “doctrine nearly eighty years ago in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire”).
13. See id. at 572 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–10 (1940)).
14. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–10 (1940).
15. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
16. Id. (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309–10). This conclusion in Cantwell was, however, a
matter of dicta rather than of holding, evidenced by the speaker Cantwell’s unfailing verbal politeness
throughout the incident in question. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 302–03 (stating that Cantwell “asked,
and received, permission” from the two men before “play[ing] the record ‘Enemies’, which attacked
the[ir] religion and church”).
17. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (footnote omitted).
18. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–26 (1973) (elaborating a four-part test, all elements of which must be proved, in order to restrict pornographic materials).
19. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25–26 (1971) (protecting the public display of a
familiar profanity in connection with objecting to the Vietnam War era military draft).
20. See, e.g., New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (imposing an actual
malice requirement and other evidentiary burdens on public official libel plaintiffs).
21. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72.
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to protected speech was thought to fall the “fighting words” uttered in Chaplinsky.22
Initially, the defendant Chaplinsky “was denouncing all religion as a
‘racket.’”23 Such speech could well be protected on the authority of the Cantwell case.24 But Chaplinsky then personally and directly addressed the town’s
official Marshal in these terms: “You are a God damned racketeer” and “a
damned Fascist.”25 Much less directly, and more abstractly, Chaplinsky concluded by declaring that “the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or
agents of Fascists.”26
The Court concluded that New Hampshire had construed the relevant statute in accord with Chaplinsky’s free speech rights.27 In particular, the scope
of the statute was confined to words that have “a direct tendency to cause acts
of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed.”28
Thus, Chaplinsky’s references to local officials, as an institution, would not
constitute fighting words.29 That Chaplinsky’s sole personal addressee was in
effect a police officer has provoked later debate over the standards to which
police officers, and other categories of public and private actors, should be
held.30
The Chaplinsky Court then relied upon the state’s understanding that the
relevant offense “is not to be defined in terms of what a particular addressee
thinks . . . . The test is what men of common intelligence would understand
would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight.”31 As might be

22. Id. at 573–74.
23. Id. at 570.
24. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308–10 (1940) (“The fundamental law declares
the interest of the United States that the free exercise of religion be not prohibited and that freedom to
communicate information and opinion be not abridged.”).
25. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569; see, e.g., Williams v. Town of Greenburgh, 535 F.3d 71, 77 (2d
Cir. 2008) (providing an example of the way courts have treated accusations associated with fascism).
In Williams, the court held that the characterization of the target as a “Junior Mussolini” using “intimidation tactics” did not constitute fighting words. 535 F.3d at 77.
26. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.
27. See id. at 573–74.
28. Id. at 573 (citing State v. Brown, 38 A. 731, 732 (N.H. 1895); State v. McConnell, 47 A. 267,
268 (N.H. 1900)). Statutes in other states similarly prohibit speech only if it is directed toward the
listener personally. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 432 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107–08 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971); Bible
Believers v. Wayne Cnty., 805 F.3d 228, 246 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
29. See supra notes 21, 26–28 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 59–63 and accompanying text.
31. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
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imagined, this odd formulation has generated substantial controversy and
much critique over time.32
Most crucially, the Chaplinsky case characterized fighting words in what
appears to be a binary and disjunctive fashion.33 Thus Chaplinsky apparently
defined fighting words as words “which by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”34 A remarkable amount
of uncertainty, ambiguity, and important controversy are compressed into this
concise formulation.35 Whatever fighting words are eventually determined to
include and exclude, they are not, as the Chaplinsky Court asserted, “welldefined.”36
Chaplinsky, and its assumptions, implications, and interpretation, will in
fact largely occupy the remainder of this Article.37 Initially, though, a few
preliminary concerns should be briefly addressed. First, the logic of Chaplinsky does not confine its scope to words.38 Presumably, fighting “words”
could, at least in some cases, encompass symbolic or expressive conduct such
as Nazi symbols or cross-burnings,39 and perhaps even physical gestures.40
More deeply, there seems to be no reason to assume, as Chaplinsky appears to do,41 that the sole reason for constitutionally protecting speech in general is for the sake of pursuing truth in one context or another. The pursuit of
truth is certainly one classically recognized and important value that freedom
of speech is thought to promote.42 But the linkage between free speech and
32. See infra Part V.
33. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 571–72 (setting forth a simplistic binary formulation of the fighting words doctrine).
36. Id. at 571.
37. See infra Parts III, VI (discussing the fighting words doctrine and its effects).
38. See infra note 40 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358, 361–
63 (2003) (applying the fighting words doctrine in the context of a cross-burning).
39. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 377 (1992) (applying the fighting words doctrine
to a cross-burning); Nat’l Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43 (1977) (per curiam)
(applying the fighting words doctrine to a march that contained prominently displayed swastikas);
Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 477 (8th Cir. 2010) (applying the fighting words doctrine to the acts of a group of protestors who dressed up as zombies and played loud music as a commentary on American consumer culture).
40. See United States v. Perez, 303 F. App’x 193, 195–96 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished opinion)
(providing a discussion of the application of the fighting words doctrine to physical gestures).
41. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (“a step to truth”).
42. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970); Irene
M. Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An Examination of John Stuart Mill’s and Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses, 27 YALE J.L. & HUMANITIES 35, 36–38 (2013); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 76, 108, 116 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1974) (explaining Mill’s classic focus
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the optimal pursuit of truth is contestable.43
More clearly, it is certainly possible to protect, or to limit, speech on other
grounds not directly linked to the pursuit of truth.44 Merely among the most
commonly cited such grounds would be the role of free speech in promoting
meaningful democratic representative government45 and promoting self-realization, self-fulfillment, and the development and flourishing of the person.46
Presumably, the scope and limits of any fighting words exceptions to freedom
of speech might thus take considerations of democracy, and of self-realization
and the flourishing of the person, into proper account as well.47
It has also been held that “‘fighting words’ need not convey an intent to
do harm, or instill fear in the listener.”48 This is a sensible understanding, at
least if the idea of “harm” is here confined to some physical harm, such as
battery, accompanying or in addition to the words in question.49 And
on the pursuit of truth through free speech).
43. See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 5
(1984) (asserting that “[s]cholarly critics” have identified “state intervention [as] necessary to correct
communicative market failures”). Without this intervention, “real world conditions . . . interfere with
the effective operation of the marketplace of ideas.” Id.
44. See, e.g., Vanessa Moore, Free Speech and the Right to Self-Realisation, 12 UCL JURIS. REV.
95, 99, 102–04, 106, 108–09 (2005) (providing justifications for freedom of speech protections beyond
furthering the pursuit of truth).
45. See, e.g., EMERSON, supra note 42, at 6–7; Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 119, 145–46 (1989) [hereinafter Free Speech Justifications] (“Because a decent political process and informed decision-making by citizens are such critical aspects of a model of liberal
democracy, and because government suppression of political ideas is so likely to be misguided, the
application of a principle of freedom of speech is centrally important.”); Alexander Tsesis, Free
Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1015, 1016 (2015) (stating that some proponents of
free speech argue that it is necessary to “further democratic institutions”).
46. See Tsesis, supra note 45, at 1016 (noting that other proponents of free speech argue that it is
necessary to provide individuals with “personal autonomy”); Free Speech Justifications, supra note
45, at 143–45 (noting that free speech protections can be justified on the grounds of “autonomy” and
“personal development”).
47. Consider, most obviously, the effects of racial and other epithets on the development and flourishing of the targets of such speech. See generally Tasnim Motala, Words Still Wound: IIED & Evolving Attitudes Towards Racist Speech, 56 HARV. CIV. RTS.- CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 115, 116 (2021)
(developing, in part, Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. CIV. RTS.–CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 133, 133 (1982)); MARI J. MATSUDA
ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1993). See also KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES,
AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 49 (1995); Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Free
Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287, 302 (1990) (“[E]pithets and more elaborate slurs . . . about race,
ethnic group, religion, sexual preference, and gender may cause continuing . . . psychological damage.”).
48. State v. Tracy, 130 A.3d 196, 209 (Vt. 2015).
49. Id. (noting that “the notion that any set of words are so provocative that they can reasonably
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certainly, while some arguable fighting words may be intended to instill fear,50
others may be intended to inflict psychological pain and suffering of one sort
or another.51
As well, not all fighting words need also fall into the category of unprotected speech known as “true threats.”52 Again, the Chaplinsky case itself53
involved no threatened violent harm to the addressee, at least of a sort contemplated by the “true threat” cases.54 And not all words that qualify, in context, as in some broad sense “abusive,” “opprobrious,” “insulting,” or conveying a sense of disgrace will also amount to fighting words.55 This may reflect
the judgment that the “insultingness” of a speech is a matter of degree, as well
of kind.56 Presumably, some insults could be de minimis, or only minimally
insulting, and thus fall outside the category of fighting words.57
Unresolved by the current case law is whether, or to what extent, fighting
words doctrine should take account of the status of the target of the speech as
a police officer, or indeed any of a range of other public and even private
be expected to lead an average listener to immediately respond with physical violence is highly problematic”).
50. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 45 (1977) (per curiam) (applying the fighting words doctrine to a march that contained prominently displayed swastikas); see also
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1199 (7th Cir. 1978) (discussing the Nationalist Socialist Party of
America’s attempt to obtain a permit to march through a town home to many Holocaust survivors).
51. Presumably, the words in Chaplinsky itself were not intended to instill fear. See supra notes
25–26 and accompanying text. Nor is fear a necessarily intended response to abusive racial or ethnic
epithets.
52. See generally Dan Korobkin, “True Threats” Case, ACLU MICHIGAN,
https://www.aclumich.org/en/cases/true-threats-case (last visited Jan. 13, 2022) (stating that the “‘true
threats’ doctrine holds that allegedly threatening speech cannot be punished unless the government
can prove that the speaker meant to communicate a serious expression of intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual”).
53. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569–70 (1942).
54. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969) (per curiam) (“If they ever make
me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.”); see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343, 359 (2003) (cross-burning case); United States v. Dutcher, 851 F.3d 757, 759 (7th Cir. 2017)
(discussing repeated verbal threats to assassinate President Obama); Lipp v. State, 227 A.3d 818,
821(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2020). See generally R. George Wright, Cyber Harassment and the Scope of
Freedom of Speech, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 187 (2020).
55. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525 (1972) (stating that the “dictionary definition of
‘opprobrious’ and ‘abusive’ give them greater reach than ‘fighting’ words”).
56. Id.
57. Imagine, for example, a case in which a generally distinguished and widely respected figure is
personally addressed in overly familiar, unduly casual, and thus disrespectful terms. For a police
officer target case, see Trammell v. State, 851 S.E.2d 834, 837 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that the
use of profane language towards a police officer cannot “rise to the level of criminal conduct that
would constitute ‘fighting words’”).
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statuses.58 It has been held that the fighting words category is narrowed in
cases of words addressed to a police officer, as “a properly trained officer may
reasonably be expected to ‘exercise a higher degree of restraint’ than the average citizen.”59 The First Amendment, it is thought, “protects a significant
amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers.”60 In particular, “nonaggressive questioning of police officers”61 is protected as long
as it does not “cross the line into fighting words or disorderly conduct.”62 But
this is certainly not to imply that abusive language directed at on-duty police
officers is always protected.63
Also unresolved is whether the logic of narrowing the class of fighting
words addressed to trained, disciplined police officers should apply as well to
other public officials,64 or to private actor addressees.65 After all, police officers are not the only parties—public or private—from whom we expect exceptional self-restraint in the face of verbal provocation.66 Any public employee whose job description includes direct in-person contact with the

58. See generally Dawn Christine Egan, “Fighting Words” Doctrine: Are Police Officers Held to
a Higher Standard, or per Bailey v. State, Do We Expect No More from Our Law Enforcement Officers
than We Do from the Average Arkansan?, 52 ARK. L. REV. 591 (1999).
59. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462 (1987) (quoting Lewis v. City of New Orleans,
415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974)); see also Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 159–60 (2d Cir.
2001).
60. Hill, 482 U.S. at 461; see also Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1139 (11th Cir. 2007)
(“Indeed, the idea that Skop’s brief inquiry to the officer somehow provided a basis for arrest collides
head-on with the First Amendment, which ‘protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers.’” (quoting Hill, 482 U.S. at 461)).
61. Patrizi v. Huff, 690 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2012).
62. Id. For an interesting disorderly conduct case involving a photojournalist’s dispute with a
police officer at an accident scene, see State v. Lashinsky, 404 A.2d 1121, 1124 (N.J. 1979).
63. For upheld fighting words convictions where the addressee was a police officer, see, e.g., Person v. State, 425 S.E.2d 371, 372 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding a conviction under the fighting words
doctrine where the defendant told a police officer that he was going to “blow [the officer’s] head off”);
Evans v.State, 373 S.E.2d 52, 53–54 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding a conviction under the fighting
words doctrine where the defendant used explicit language when addressing a police officer); State v.
Hale, 110 N.E.3d 890, 894 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (holding that explicit language directed at a police
officer fell within the fighting words doctrine); and State v. Wood, 679 N.E.2d 735, 741 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1996) (applying the fighting words doctrine to explicit language directed at two police officers).
64. See United States v. Poocha, 259 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that “fighting words
is at its narrowest, if indeed it exists at all, with respect to criminal prosecution for speech directed at
public officials” (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73–74 (1964))).
65. See, e.g., State v. Baccala, 163 A.3d 1, 14–15 (Conn. 2017) (presenting a situation where a
defendant used cruel and offensive language directed at a private store manager).
66. Cf. Strasser, supra note 2, at 288–90 (discussing how the Arizona Supreme Court held a teacher
to a reasonable teacher standard, rather than just the reasonable person standard).
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general public might be expected to exercise distinctive self-restraint. But
then, why not expand this category to include public school teachers,67 emergency room employees, public-facing supervisors and managers at large retail
facilities,68 nurses, social workers, repossessors of vehicles, and clergy?
There is, thus, an argument to be made that narrowing the scope of
fighting words addressed to police officers carries over, by its own logic, to a
wide range of public and private addressees.69 The question of whether the
scope of the fighting words category should be restricted is, however, impossible to contain within the context of which addressees are relevantly similar
to police officers.70 As it turns out, narrowing the scope of—if not abolishing
entirely—the category of fighting words is the dominant trend in contemporary case law and in scholarly discussions.71

67. See, e.g., In re Nickolas S., 245 P.3d 446, 447 (Ariz. 2011) (discussing an incident where a
student used explicit language directed at a public school teacher).
68. See Baccala, 163 A.3d at 14–15.
69. See generally DUPAGE CNTY. BAR ASS’N, FIGHTING WORDS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
IT’S TIME TO TAKE THE PUNCH OUT OF THEIR PROTECTION 5–6 (1992), https://www.stephenbrundagelaw.com/images/pdf/FightingWords1992September.pdf (showing that those courts which do apply
a higher standard for application of the fighting words doctrine to police officers also do so “in a
variety of different factual contexts”).
70. See generally id.
71. See Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument for Its Interment, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1129 (1993) (arguing that the fighting words doctrine should be “eliminate[d] entirely”).
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III. THE MOVEMENT TO LIMIT, IF NOT ABOLISH, THE FIGHTING WORDS
CATEGORY
The shrinkage, in practice, of the prohibitable fighting words category in
general is widely recognized.72 In the words of one Ohio court: “That the
category of ‘fighting words’ has been shrinking is obvious—the Supreme
Court has overturned every single fighting words conviction it has reviewed
since Chaplinsky was decided in 1942.”73 At the very least, the continued
vitality of Chaplinsky has been subject to academic debate74 in the absence of
any explicit guidance from the Court. It seems fair to say that “[i]n recent
years . . . Chaplinsky’s ‘fighting words’ doctrine has become ‘very limited.’”75
It is then natural to ask why this trend toward limiting the scope of the
fighting words doctrine has developed.76 As it turns out, the most prominent
explanations refer to broader cultural developments.77 A popular account has
it that “due to changing social norms, public discourse has become coarser in
the years following Chaplinsky.”78 On this approach, “[s]tandards of decorum
have changed dramatically since 1942.”79 The inference is, on this basis, then
drawn, by way of remarkable understatement, that “indelicacy no longer
places speech beyond the protection of the First Amendment.”80 And so on
this approach, “there are [far] fewer combinations of words and circumstances

72. See People ex rel. R.C., 411 P.3d 1105, 1110 (Colo. App. 2016) (highlighting the widespread
belief that the fighting words category is shrinking, as evidenced by contemporary Supreme Court
jurisprudence).
73. See id. (citing Caine, supra note 1, at 536).
74. See, e.g., Wood v. Eubanks, 459 F. Supp. 3d 965, 975 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (similarly citing Burton
Caine to support the assertion that modern scholars have “debate[d] the continued vitality of Chaplinsky”); see also Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 580–81
(1980) (advocating for the abandonment of the fighting words doctrine).
75. Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 896 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250,
1255 (6th Cir. 1997)); see also Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 718 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that “[t]he
fighting-words doctrine has become ‘very limited’” (quoting Greene, 310 F.3d at 896)); State v.
Drahota, 788 N.W.2d 796, 802 (Neb. 2010) (stating that “the Supreme Court has largely abandoned
Chaplinsky’s ‘inflict injury’ standard”).
76. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (limiting the fighting words doctrine to
statements of “direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs”).
77. See generally David L. Hudson Jr., Fighting Words, FREEDOM FORUM INST.,
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-of-speech-2/personal-public-expression-overview/fighting-words/ (July 2009).
78. State v. Liebenguth, 250 A.3d 1, 12 (Conn. 2020).
79. Barnes, 449 F.3d at 718 (quoting Greene, 310 F.3d at 896); Greene, 310 F.3d at 896; State v.
Baccala, 163 A.3d 1, 7–8 (Conn. 2017).
80. Barnes, 449 F.3d at 718 (quoting Greene, 310 F.3d at 896); Greene, 310 F.3d at 896.
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that are likely to fit within the fighting words exception”81 to freedom of
speech.
No doubt, the sense of a generally reduced civility of discourse is widespread.82 Let us simply assume a reduction of civility, since the time of Chaplinsky, in the relevant contexts.83 Public discursive encounters are thus, on
this assumption, less civil, in general, than formerly.84
The question then becomes one of how free speech law should address
this cultural shift.85 It is certainly possible to pursue the popular line, according to which we are now used to increasing incivility and thus inured, or desensitized, to insulting and abusive language.86 This could be so even if the
insulting and abusive language is in some instances more severe than was earlier common.87 The sensible response to increasingly frequent incivility and
abuse is, on this approach, to diminish our expectations accordingly and to
legally accommodate increasingly frequent interactive verbal abuse.88
It is also possible, however, to view such an approach as passivist, defeatist, and essentially decadent. Presumably, the proper response to a long-term

81. Liebenguth, 250 A.3d at 12–13.
82. See, e.g., TERESA M. BEJAN, MERE CIVILITY: DISAGREEMENT AND THE LIMITS OF TOLERATION (2017); A CRISIS OF CIVILITY? POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND ITS DISCONTENTS (Robert G. Boatright et al. eds., 1st ed. (2019)); KEITH J. BYBEE, HOW CIVILITY WORKS (2016); STEPHEN L. CARTER,
CIVILITY: MANNERS, MORALS, AND THE ETIQUETTE OF DEMOCRACY (1998); SUSAN HERBST, RUDE
DEMOCRACY: CIVILITY AND INCIVILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (2020); ALEX ZAMALIN, AGAINST
CIVILITY: THE HIDDEN RACISM IN OUR OBSESSION WITH CIVILITY (2021) (discussing modern civility
more critically). See generally BENET DAVETIAN, CIVILITY: A CULTURAL HISTORY (2009).
83. See, e.g., Richard Carufel, Civility Remains a “Major” Problem in America—and Social Media Is Only Making It Worse, AGILITY PR SOLUTIONS (July 8, 2019), https://www.agilitypr.com/prnews/public-relations/civility-remains-a-major-problem-in-america-and-social-media-is-only-making-it-worse/.
84. See generally id. (discussing a rising civility problem in America).
85. Cf. R. George Wright, Freedom of Speech as a Cultural Holdover, 40 PACE L. REV. 235, 263–
69 (2019) (discussing free speech under present cultural conditions).
86. See id. at 270 (arguing that the trend towards increased incivility in our society has decreased
the “meaningfulness” of “protecting speech” while increasing “some key cultural costs of freedom of
speech” protections).
87. See Qiusi Sun et al., Over-Time Trends in Incivility on Social Media: Evidence from Political,
Non-Political, and Mixed Sub-Reddits over Eleven Years, FRONTIERS IN POL. SCI. (Nov. 2, 2021),
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpos.2021.741605/full (conducting a statistical study of
online incivility and noting that, since 2015, “incivility has been gradually increasing” online).
88. Wright, Freedom of Speech as a Cultural Holdover, supra note 85, at 270 (“[T]he traditionally
cited free speech values of the pursuit of knowledge and truth, meaningful democratic self-government, and the promotion of genuine autonomy and self-realization have gradually evolved, in our
culture, in ways that have reduced their meaningfulness and their power to justify constitutionally
protecting speech generally at the expense of significant and more elemental values.”).
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increase in any interpersonal crime, such as assault or battery, is not to counsel, out of a sense of fatalistic realism, greater tolerance on the part of the
victims.89 And it seems especially dubious to require racial, and a range of
other, minority group members to recognize the ongoing coarsening of public
discourse and defensively adjust their psychological responses accordingly.90
Perhaps the recommendation, on this dubious theory, would thus be for the
most vulnerable group members to read and follow the great Stoics, if not to
develop some sort of defensive psychological carapace. Why such an evidently defeatist and regressive approach is optimal is left largely unexplained.91
The courts have, however, asserted more broadly that “[t]he fighting
words exception is very limited because it is inconsistent with the general
principle of free speech recognized in our First Amendment jurisprudence.”92
This claim is thought to be supported in particular by the classic rhetoric of
the Terminiello93 heckler’s veto case. In the words of the Terminiello case, “a
[principal] function of free speech . . . is to invite dispute. It may indeed best
serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.”94
The logic of Terminiello, however, hardly supports any general narrowing
of the fighting words doctrine.95 It is true that fighting words often, but hardly
always, stir the target to anger.96 But it is rather a stretch to claim that fighting
words induce a condition of unrest in the target in the sense plainly intended

89. See Richard Stengel, Opinion: Why America Needs a Hate Speech Law, WASH. POST (Oct. 29,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/10/29/why-america-needs-hate-speech-law/
(arguing for the implementation of hate speech laws that would protect individuals from verbal abuse
online).
90. See sources cited supra note 47.
91. Cf. Stengel, supra note 89 (asserting that legislators should implement hate speech laws in the
United States to avoid creating a society that is increasingly tolerant to incivility).
92. Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250, 1255 (6th Cir. 1997); Baskin v. Smith, 50 F. App’x 731, 736
(6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished opinion).
93. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 3 (1949).
94. Id. at 4 (quoted in Sandul, 119 F.3d at 1255).
95. See generally Toni-Ann Williams, The Fighting Words Doctrine, FOUNDS. OF L. & SOC’Y
(Dec. 7, 2018), https://foundationsoflawandsociety.wordpress.com/2018/12/07/the-fighting-wordsdoctrine/ (stating that the Terminiello Court held that language that merely “causes public anger” cannot be prohibited without running afoul of the First Amendment).
96. See Linda Friedlieb, The Epitome of an Insult: A Constitutional Approach to Designated
Fighting Words, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 385, 408–10 (2005) (noting that the current confines of the fighting
words doctrine are determined by looking to “traditional concepts of which insults would provoke
which listeners into breaching the peace”).
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in Terminiello.97 Nor do fighting words typically create, within their target or
more broadly, “dissatisfaction with conditions as they are”98 in the sense that
Terminiello envisions.
It is certainly possible that, for example, personally targeted victims of
racial epithets may, as a result of one or more such incidents, become angry
and dissatisfied with conditions as they are, including, indeed, a culture of
constitutionally protected overtly racist and otherwise discriminatory personalized speech.99 But this form of reactionary anger is hardly what Terminiello
contemplates.100 Coarse personal insults do not generally prompt political reassessment on the part of the target thereof. Terminiello instead envisions a
speaker whose forceful rhetoric persuades some listeners to seriously consider, if not subscribe to, the underlying message of the speech in question.101
The logic, and perhaps the breadth, of the fighting words doctrine has also
been attacked from another perspective.102 Feminists have understandably
characterized the fighting words doctrine, or some elements thereof, as stereotypically masculinist and anachronistic at best.103
The doctrine’s focus on words likely to provoke either an “average” or
some more particularized, non-hypersensitive person to immediately fight is
not merely selective but is unjustifiably biased, and indeed perversely so.104
On its own logic, this prong of the fighting words doctrine protects even the

97. See Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 3–4 (stating that speech “is . . . protected against censorship or
punishment unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that
rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest”).
98. Id. at 4.
99. See Robert J. Boeckmann & Jeffrey Liew, Hate Speech: Asian American Students’ Justice
Judgments and Psychological Responses, 58 J. SOC’Y ISSUES 363 (2002) (describing and analyzing
experiments that measured the psychological response of racist hate speech victims).
100. See Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 13 (discussing concerns that fighting words would incite anger,
leading to riots and disorderly mobs).
101. Id. at 4.
102. See The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine, supra note 71, at 1146.
103. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justice of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22, 42 (1992); The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine, supra note 71, at 1146
(noting and critiquing the anachronistic, reactive, violence-focused, and stereotypically male bias of
the fighting words cases); Wendy B. Reilly, Note, Fighting the Fighting Words Standard: A Call for
Its Destruction, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 947, 948 (2000) (“[T]he current fighting words standard fails to
protect the interests of women, people of color, gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, or transgendered people.”); Jeffrey Rosen, “Fighting Words,” LEGAL AFFS., https://legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June2002/scene_rosen_mayjun2002.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
104. See Reilly, supra note 103, at 947 (“By focusing on imminent violence as the harm to be
avoided, the doctrine inherently discriminates among victims based on their perceived propensity to
become violent.”).
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most sustained and severely abusive language where the addressee is of a class
that is predictably unwilling, or unable, for any reason, to respond with a physical battery.105 So, perversely, women, frail and elderly people, and persons
with various disabilities, among other groups, receive categorically less protection from abusive targeted speech than do those persons who are more willing and able to react with immediate violence.
This perverse result can be thought of as a vestige of historic masculinist106 conceptions of violence, of one sort or another, as a response to perceived
slights, affronts, and indignities.107 The result, however, hardly displays even
any classical chivalric concern for the well-being of those persons who are
unable or unwilling to employ immediate reactive violence.108
One obvious, and quite sensible, response to the dubious logic of the reactive violence prong of the fighting words doctrine is to instead emphasize

105. See id. at 948 (“The effect of focusing on potential violence is that the same words become
regulable when directed at someone who would be likely to react violently to a verbal assault, but not
regulable when directed at someone who would be unlikely to react violently.”).
106. See generally Scott Atkinson, Why Men Fight—And What It Says About Masculinity, GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/12/modern-masculinity-men-fighting-scott-atkinson (Oct. 2, 2017, 1:52 PM); Alan Booth et al., Testosterone and Social Behavior, 85 SOC. FORCES
167 (2006); Harmful Masculinity and Violence, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, www.apa.org/pi/about/newsletter/2018/09/harmful-masculinity (last visited Mar. 11, 2022); Ellen Hendrickson, How To Fight Toxic
Masculinity, SCI. AM. (July 26, 2019), www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-to-fight-toxic-masculinity; Jesse Prinz, Why Are Men So Violent?, PSYCH. TODAY (Feb. 3, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/experiments-in-philosophy/201202/why-are-men-so-violent; Anne Harding,
Men’s Testosterone Levels Declined in Last Twenty Years, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2007, 3:21 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/health-testosterone-levels-dc/mens-testosterone-levels-declined-inlast-20-years-idUKKIM16976320061031; George Herrera, Medical Study: Generational Decrease of
Testosterone Levels in Men, BODY RX (Oct. 15, 2020, 3:55 PM), https://www.bodyrxantiaging.com/medical-studies/medical-study-generational-decrease-testosterone-levels-men/.
107. See generally KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE HONOR CODE: HOW MORAL REVOLUTIONS
HAPPEN (2010); JOHN NORRIS, PISTOLS AT DAWN: A HISTORY OF DUELING (2009); VINCENTO SAVIOLO, A GENTLEMAN’S GUIDE TO DUELLING (2013); JOHN LYDE WILSON, THE CODE OF HONOR; OR
RULES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PRINCIPALS AND SECONDS IN DUELING (1858). Honor-based dueling cases, of course, involve some lapse of time between the alleged affront and any ritualized response
thereto. See generally R. George Wright, “What Is That Honor?”: Re-Thinking Free Speech in the
‘Stolen Valor’ Case, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 847, 847 n.2 (2013) (historical cross-cultural survey).
108. See Reilly, supra note 103, at 947–49. The law does indeed take categories such as gender,
age, and disability into account in assessing the likelihood of physical retaliation by a non-hypersensitive victim. See, e.g., State v. Baccala, 163 A.3d 1, 8–9 (Conn. 2017) (“A proper examination of
context also considers those personal attributes of the speaker and the addressee that are reasonably
apparent because they are necessarily a part of the objective situation in which the speech was made.”);
Jennifer Wollock, Chivalry Is Not About Opening Doors, but Protecting Society’s Most Vulnerable
from Attack, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 23, 2021, 8:32 AM), https://theconversation.com/chivalry-isnot-about-opening-doors-but-protecting-societys-most-vulnerable-from-attack-157116.
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the alternative Chaplinsky prong.109 Persons who are unable or unwilling to
respond to grave insults with an immediate battery may well undergo some
cognizable injury as a result of the utterance of the language in question.110
However sensible such a shift in emphasis might be, it unfortunately runs
counter to a dominant case law trend.111
Specifically, it has been observed that even the Chaplinsky case itself did
not, and had no occasion to, develop the “words that ‘by their very utterance
inflict injury’” prong of fighting words.112 It has been said that after Chaplinsky itself, “the Court has either dropped the ‘inflict-injury’ alternative altogether or simply recited the full Chaplinsky definition without further reference to any distinction between merely hurtful speech and speech that tends
to provoke an immediate breach of the peace.”113 More concisely, it is said
that “the Court has effectively eliminated the ‘inflict injury’ prong of the
‘fighting words’ analysis.”114
Certainly, a number of Supreme Court cases have continued to refer explicitly, if only in dicta, to the ‘inflict injury’ prong.115 The lower courts have
often done so as well.116 But there is, equally, a tendency on the part of the

109. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining fighting words as
“those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace”).
110. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
111. See supra Parts II, III (discussing the evolution of case law evolving from the Chaplinsky case);
see infra notes 120–22 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Purtell v. Mason, 527 F.3d 615, 623 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S.
at 572).
113. Id. (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (cross-burning case decided without
reference to the inflict-injury prong)); see also The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine, supra note 71, at 1129; Clay Calvert, Fighting Words in the Era of Texts, IMs and E-Mails: Can
a Disparaged Doctrine Be Resuscitated To Punish Cyber-Bullies?, 21 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 3 (2010).
114. United States v. Bartow, 997 F.3d 203, 207 (4th Cir. 2021); see also Purtell, 527 F.3d at 625
(“We see nothing in the Supreme Court’s more recent iterations of the fighting-words doctrine that
would presage a revitalization of the ‘inflict injury’ alternative in the Chaplinsky definition.”).
115. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 430 (1989) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (public flagburning demonstration case); Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (intentional infliction of emotional distress via magazine ad parody case); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461–
62 (1987); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 903 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting); Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 298 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
116. See Hoyland v. McMenomy, 869 F.3d 644, 655 (8th Cir. 2017); Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 770 (9th Cir. 2014) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting); Barnes v. Wright, 449
F.3d 709, 717 (6th Cir. 2006); Gower v. Vercler, 377 F.3d 661, 670 (7th Cir. 2004); State v. Hoffman,
387 N.E.2d 239, 242 (Ohio 1979).
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Supreme Court,117 and of the lower courts,118 to elide, ignore, or abandon the
Chaplinsky “inflict injury” alternative prong.
Thus the Court has selectively declared that “[i]t is clear that ‘fighting
words’—those that provoke immediate violence—are not protected by the
First Amendment.”119 A bit more elaborately, the Tenth Circuit has declared
that “[w]e define ‘fighting words’ as ‘epithets (1) directed at the person of the
hearer, (2) inherently likely to cause a violent reaction, and (3) playing no role
in the expression of ideas.’”120 And the Connecticut Supreme Court has announced, explicitly, that “‘[f]ighting words’ are defined as speech that has ‘a
direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually,
the remark is addressed.’”121 The “inflict injury” alternative prong thus drops
out.
This downgrading, if not abandonment, of any concern for words which
by their very utterance inflict a sufficiently serious injury is ill-considered.122
It is hardly as though the problem of epithet-based direct verbal abuse, on
grounds of personal or group identity, has evaporated since Chaplinsky.123 In
contrast, it is instead the reactive violence prong in Chaplinsky that may well

117. See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 766 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)) (true threat case); Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (apparently
characterizing fighting words in general, but referring only to the reactive violence prong); NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982).
118. See, e.g., Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist., 523 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 2008)
(stating that “‘fighting words,’ words [are] likely to provoke a violent reaction and hence a breach of
the peace”); Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 358 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Black, 538 U.S. at 358–
59; Barnes, 449 F.3d at 717); Burns v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Jackson Cnty., 330 F.3d 1275, 1285
(10th Cir. 2003); State v. Parnoff, 186 A.3d 640, 646 (Conn. 2018).
119. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 927 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942)). Of course, this formulation oversimplifies even the reactive violence prong. See
id.
120. Burns, 330 F.3d at 1285 (quoting Cannon v. City of Denver, 998 F.2d 867, 873 (10th Cir.
1993)). There seems no reason, incidentally, why only “epithets” can qualify as fighting words. See
Klen v. City of Loveland, 661 F.3d 498, 509 (10th Cir. 2011).
121. Parnoff, 186 A.3d at 646 (quoting State v. Baccala, 163 A.3d 1, 4 (Conn. 2017)). This formulation, incidentally, ignores the distinction between the actual addressee and some presumed average
addressee, however conceived and particularized, as contemplated by Chaplinsky itself. See id.; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
122. See Reilly, supra note 103, 947–49 (asserting that the current approach to the fighting words
doctrine is “inadequa[te] . . . to address contemporary social hatred”).
123. See id. at 948 (citations omitted) (stating that the “current fighting words standard fails to protect the interests of women, people of color, gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, or transgendered people”).
One might even assume that as some categories and statuses come to be increasingly salient in the
public mind, the incidence of direct verbal abuse on those grounds may increase.
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be of diminishing current importance.124
Merely for example, as of 2013 the Westboro Baptist group had engaged
in emotionally provocative protests at perhaps 500 military funerals.125 One
might well think of such exceptionally controversial protest demonstrations
as fraught with the possibility of a reactive violence fighting words incident.126
Yet, the Eighth Circuit reported that, as of 2013, “[i]n truth, there have been
few to no reported instances of violence associated with Westboro’s 500 protests at military funerals.”127 Of course, this absence of reactive violence says
little about any personal injuries directly inflicted by the speech in question
and, thus, about Chaplinsky’s alternative prong.128
The case for abandoning the Chaplinsky fighting words doctrine, at least
with respect to the “inflict injury” prong thereof, is, thus, far weaker than one
might have imagined.129 But before we can reach a definitive conclusion to
that effect, we must take fuller account of the free speech side of the question.130 The fighting words doctrine, and the “inflict injury” prong in particular, is on its strongest foundation only to the extent that the doctrine fully accommodates all legitimate free speech interests.131 How an accommodation
of free speech interests with the interests of the targets of fighting words might
be reached is discussed in Part IV.132

124, See supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text (highlighting the problematic underpinnings
of this prong in particular).
125. See Phelps-Roper v. Koster, 713 F.3d 942, 948 (8th Cir. 2013).
126. See id.
127. Id. See generally Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (providing a broader discussion of
the Westboro Baptist military funeral protest phenomenon).
128. See Phelps-Roper, 713 F.3d at 947–49 (failing to discuss Chaplinsky’s personal injury prong
in applying the fighting words doctrine).
129. See supra Parts II, III.
130. See infra Part IV.
131. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992) (highlighting that the protections
of the First Amendment only allow regulation of speech that has no legitimate “social value”).
132. See infra Part IV.
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IV. RECONCILING THE FIGHTING WORDS DOCTRINE AND THE VALUE OF
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Typically, language that arguably amounts to fighting words conveys,
however inarticulately, some more or less coherent message.133 Some sort of
message, idea, opinion, or other substantive content is thus assumedly present.134 Whatever the logic of regulating fighting words may be, that logic
cannot generally assume that no cognizable underlying idea or opinion is present. Free speech, and the crucial reasons for protecting speech in the first
place, must therefore be accommodated by any sound fighting words doctrine.135
Chaplinsky itself intriguingly suggests that fighting words in general pose
only a minimal free speech problem because “such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas.”136 This argument, and this test, can stand on
its own.137 The Chaplinsky court, however, then goes on to engage in a balancing test.138 In particular, the Court suggests that actionable fighting words
“are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and

133. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011) (holding that the signs used by protestors
which contained derogatory language directed at gay people “relate[d] to broad issues of interest to
society at large”). There are, however, close cases in which the extreme offensiveness of the language
does not seem at all proportionate to any evident underlying grievance or other message. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bartow, 997 F.3d 203, 207 (4th Cir. 2021) (describing an incident where the defendant, a member of the Marine Corps, addressed a female Marine Corps member in a demeaning manner); State v. Baccala, 163 A.3d 1, 14 (Conn. 2017) (“The defendant’s angry words were an obvious
expression of frustration at not being able to obtain services to which she thought she was entitled.”);
State v. Broadstone, 447 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Neb. 1989) (an underlying message or grievance as not especially evident).
134. See, e.g., Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2314 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (stating that “obscenity,” “lewd” statements, and “defamation” may be regulated because they are “viewpoint neutral”); Klen v. City of Loveland, 661 F.3d 498, 509 (10th Cir.
2011) (“[M]ost if not all of the Klens’ offensive epithets were not fighting words, because they did
express ideas—chiefly that city building department officials were incompetent and were taking too
long in processing plaintiffs’ application for a building permit.”).
135. See Michael J. Mannheimer, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1550
(1993) (citations omitted) (“[R]egulations on speech are accorded a different level of scrutiny than
ordinary economic or social legislation, owing to the underlying values of speech and the prominent
place free speech holds in our constitutional scheme.”).
136. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
137. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 n.18 (1978) (plurality opinion) (stating that
determining whether the use of profane language is protected by considering the language itself, rather
than the underlying context, would be a standard of “form, rather than” substance).
138. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.

823

[Vol. 49: 805, 2022]

Fighting Words Today
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

morality.”139
It is certainly possible to argue that the value, in any relevant sense, of,
say, personally targeted hostile racial epithets is indeed outweighed, categorically or at some particularized level, by whatever we take the social interest
in order and morality to be.140 As the Supreme Court has more recently declared, there can be categories of speech in which “the evil to be restricted so
overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no
process of case-by-case adjudication [within the category] is required.”141
For our purposes, we need take no issue with the claim, made in the animal cruelty video case of United States v. Stevens,142 that “free speech does
not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of
relative social costs and benefits.”143 The Stevens case quotes, without repudiating, the crucial language of Chaplinsky itself.144 Stevens leaves the category of fighting words, as a general exception to free speech, intact.145 And
this is perfectly sensible, as balancing, whether categorical or more particularized, is really not of the essence of Chaplinsky.146
More specifically, under Chaplinsky the crucial focus of attention is on
whether the utterance—whether on its own, in ad hoc fashion, or as an instance of some broader category of speech—is “no essential part of any exposition of ideas.”147 And the popularity of any relevant idea or opinion, or lack
thereof, is of course irrelevant.148
In a typical case of alleged fighting words, the speech at issue involves
two judicially distinguishable elements. The separability of these two elements may well be imperfect, and any separation of these two elements may

139. Id.; see also Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 357–58 (6th Cir. 2007); Chaker v. Crogan,
428 F.3d 1215, 1223–24 (9th Cir. 2005).
140. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982) (child pornography case).
141. Id.
142. 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010).
143. Id.
144. See id. at 470–71.
145. See id.
146. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
147. Id.
148. See Shawn Francis Peters, Re-hearing “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire in
Retrospect, 24 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 282, 285 (1999) (stating that “[t]he law knows no finer hour than
when it cuts through formal concepts and transitory emotions to protect unpopular citizens against
discrimination and persecution” (quoting Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 561 (1944) (Murphy,
J., dissenting))).

824

[Vol. 49: 805, 2022]

Fighting Words Today
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

be more or less readily performed in any particular case.149 But the courts
actually perform this act of forensic separation in practice without, ordinarily,
undue difficulty. Thus, one arguable instance of fighting words was judicially
found to express frustration at “not being able to obtain services to which [the
defendant] thought she was entitled.”150 That would, thus, be the idea or opinion at issue. And in another such arguable instance, the relevant idea or opinion was found to be that particular city officials “were incompetent and were
taking too long in processing plaintiffs’ application for a building permit.”151
Thus, where there is some minimally intelligible message to be found,
courts can typically ascertain, with reasonable fidelity, the intended message,
opinion, or idea. The Supreme Court has, accordingly, recently validated the
distinction between the message underlying the alleged fighting words, or the
content of that message, and the “particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey.”152
We need not go so far as to claim that the objectionable mode of speech—
the fighting words themselves—are, unlike the underlying message, essentially “nonspeech.”153 The question is really one of any incremental value, in
any relevant free speech terms, of choosing the mode of fighting words to
express the underlying, more or less distinct, message or idea. That is, what,
if anything, do the fighting words and their abusiveness themselves add—or
subtract—from the overall free speech value of the speaker’s underlying message?154 And then, in many cases, we must consider the costs of the particular
fighting words themselves, in terms of the free speech values associated with
any relevant speech by the target of the fighting words.155 The targets of
fighting words may well have their own free speech interests. After all, any

149. See Eric John Neis, The Fiery Cross: Virginia v. Black, History, and the First Amendment, 50
S.D. L. REV. 182, 195–96, 216 (2005).
150. State v. Baccala, 163 A.3d 1, 14 (Conn. 2017).
151. Klen v. City of Loveland, 661 F.3d 498, 509 (10th Cir. 2011).
152. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2314 (2019) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 393 (1992)); see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993) (commenting on R.A.V.);
Swiecicki v. Delgado, 463 F.3d 489, 499 (6th Cir. 2006) (per R.A.V., the underlying message may
well be protectable “even though a particular ‘mode of speech’ (such as fighting words) may not be”).
153. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) (apparently reflecting on the “expressive”
character of many fighting words).
154 See Mannheimer, supra note 135, at 1558–59 (stating that “there is still no general First Amendment protection for fighting words” because “the mode of expression is entirely severable from the
ideas expressed”).
155. See id. (noting that, where the “value” of the speech is “slight,” the speech is more likely to be
regulable).
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incremental value of the abusiveness of fighting words to the speaker may
undermine or impair the free speech values of, and the speech-related opportunities realistically available to, the target of such speech.156
Let us thus assume that in a typical fighting words context the speaker,
and perhaps the target of the speech in question, can make some sort of claim
to advancing the basic purposes underlying free speech in the first place.157
We may assume the basic purposes, or reasons, for constitutionally protecting
speech to be plural. Most typically, freedom of speech is thought to optimally
promote the pursuit of truth; the goal of autonomy, self-realization, or personal flourishing; and a genuinely meaningful representative democratic process.158 These considerations should therefore be jurisprudentially important.159
This is not to suggest that judges in any given fighting words case should
directly determine whether the distinctive fighting words in the case, above
and beyond any discernible underlying message, promote, fail to promote, or
undermine, from the perspective of the speaker or the target, any or all of these
three basic free speech values.160 But the nature, scope, and limits of the basic
reasons for protecting speech should, plainly, ultimately guide the scope of
what we determine to be unprotected fighting words.161
At least one basic reason for protecting speech was discussed in the antimilitary-draft-jacket case of Cohen v. California.162 Cohen focuses on the
realm of “public discussion.”163 The hope is that freedom of discussion “will
ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfectly polity,”164 on
the assumption that “no other approach would comport with the premise of
individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.”165 And

156. See EMERSON, supra note 42, at 6.
157. See, e.g., State v. Baccala, 163 A.3d 1, 28 (Conn. 2017).
158. See, e.g., EMERSON, supra note 42, at 6–7; FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); Free Speech Justifications, supra note 45, 130–47.
159. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
160. Friedlieb, supra note 96, at 411–13 (discussing whether it is legislatively possible to create a
comprehensive “list of fighting words” based on the principles underlying the doctrine).
161. See id.
162. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
163. Id. at 24.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing the classic opinion of Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–
77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969) (per curiam)).
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what Cohen seems to focus on, as potential concerns, are “tumult,”166 “discord,”167 “verbal cacophony,”168 annoyance,169 distastefulness,170 squeamishness,171 “vulgarity,” “taste and style,”172 emotivism,173 and immoderation174 in
discussing “public men and measures”175 in particular.
Cohen nicely illustrates the basic disjunction between recourse to typical
fighting words and the crucial reasons for distinctively protecting speech in
general.176 The objection to actual fighting words—think of directed hostile
racial epithets, for example—is not a concern, as Cohen would have it, for
tumult, verbal discord, verbal cacophony, mere annoyance, mere distastefulness, squeamishness in the face of profanity, vulgarity, distastefulness of
style, emotivism, or lack of moderation.177 To try to reduce the concern for
abusive racial epithets,178 for example, to categories such as policy disagreement, sound versus noise, squeamishness, or distaste is to trivialize the effects,
as well as the likely underlying intentions, of such speech.
More directly, typical fighting words incidents do not qualify as some sort
of minimally reciprocal, mutualist, dialogic, interactive “public discussion.”179 How fighting words in particular, above and beyond their underlying
non-abusive, if forceful or strongly emotional, message would generally contribute to the goal of “a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity”180 is
utterly mysterious at best. And to suggest that fighting words in general contribute, overall, to the individual dignity of the speaker, let alone of the target,181 would be absurd.

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 25.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 26.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 25 (“We cannot lose sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a trifling
and annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege, . . . fundamental societal values
are truly implicated.”).
177. See id.
178. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
179. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
180. Id.
181. See id.
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None of this is to deny that the overall, perhaps partly illocutionary, meaning of typical fighting words may well be different from an equally emotionally fervent but non-abusive expression of a message. But as the case law
recognizes, including in the context of Chaplinsky’s fighting words,182 protecting even the strongly emotional expression of the underlying idea, but not
the personally abusive expression thereof, need hardly involve anything remotely like any invidious censorship.183
In typical cases, incentivizing the avoidance of fighting words may well
advance, rather than impair, any relevant search for truth; the value of democratic political functioning; or the goal of self-realization, the presumed basic
purposes of free speech in the first place.184 It is perhaps technically possible
to claim that, say, racially, sexually, or otherwise basic identity-focused epithets might somehow promote the self-realization and flourishing of the
speaker.185 But even if such a claim could ever be at all plausible, the courts
would then be logically bound to consider whether, much more plausibly, the
target’s being subjected to central identity-based vilification tends to impair
the target’s own self-realization and flourishing.186
This approach to the regulation of fighting words, thus, does not fall afoul
of the court’s general rejection or disfavoring of content-based restrictions on
speech.187 Some, but not all, fighting words restrictions could well pass a strict
scrutiny constitutional test.188 But on our approach, restrictions on fighting
words need not pass any such test because the restriction should be essentially

182. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (plurality opinion) (citing Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
183. See id. at 743 n.18 (“A requirement that indecent language be avoided will have its primary
effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts
that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.”).
184. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
185. See Motala, supra note 47, at 116–17 (providing an example of an interaction that led to the
utterance of a race-based epithet).
186. See id. (describing the emotional effects of a race-based verbal attack on the speech’s target);
sources cited supra note 47.
187. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 171 (2015) (internal citation omitted)
(“[C]ontent-based restrictions on speech . . . can stand only if they survive strict scrutiny, ‘which
requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest.’”).
188. See id. at 160–61, 171–72 (holding that a statute which prohibited the display of “Ideological”
and “Political Sign[s]” could not survive strict scrutiny because it was not sufficiently “narrowly tailored” to promote the government interest of “preserving the Town’s aesthetic appeal and [maintaining] traffic safety”).
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message-insensitive.189 The aim is, again, not to suppress any political or
other cognizable idea.190 Essentially, sensible regulations of fighting words
allow the speaker to convey any cognizable message or idea, however emotionally, but to do so without severe personal abuse, which typically undermines the free speech values associated with the target’s own speech (if not
also, ironically, those of the speaker).191
V. THE REAL WORLD OF FIGHTING WORDS AND THE ANTI-REALISM OF
THE DOCTRINE TODAY
It is hardly surprising, or objectionable, that the fighting words doctrine
results in some close, readily contestable, and even dubious case outcomes.192
What is surprising, unnecessary, and objectionable is instead what we might
call the peculiar anti-realism of much of the fighting words doctrine, as developed and often applied in the cases. This anti-realism is manifested in the
sheer disconnect between the acknowledged purposes and costs of free speech
on the one hand and what the relevant case law actually deems to be constitutionally significant.
Consider, to begin with, the fighting words case of State v. Baccala.193
In this case, the disorderly conduct defendant-speaker was “a forty year old
woman who used a cane due to a medical condition that caused severe swelling in her lower extremities.”194 The target of the defendant’s verbal wrath
was an assistant manager on duty at a Connecticut supermarket.195 The defendant initially spoke over the telephone, rather than in person, to the

189. See supra Part IV.
190. See, e.g., Free Speech Justifications, supra note 45, at 130–47.
191. See sources cited supra note 47.
192. For an example of one fighting words case opinion seeking to distinguish another on questionable grounds, see State v. Matthews, 111 A.3d 390, 404–05 (R.I. 2015) (distinguishing State v.
McKenna, 415 A.2d 729 (R.I. 1980)). The court’s reasoning appears strained. Compare State v.
Matthews, 111 A.3d 390, 404 (R.I. 2015) (holding that defendant’s insulting and threatening speech
towards police officers constituted fighting words because the speech was directed at the officers rather than a group of individuals and the defendant was in close proximity), with State v. McKenna,
415 A.2d 729, 731 (R.I. 1980) (holding defendant’s abusive language did not constitute fighting words
because the defendant addressed her remarks to a group of five men, spoke to them as a group, and
was standing some fifteen feet away when she delivered her insults”).
193. 163 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2017). For commentary, see State v. Liebenguth, 250 A.3d 1, 21–22 (Conn.
2020).
194. Baccala, 163 A.3d at 4.
195. Id.
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assistant store manager.196
The defendant wanted, in essence, to process a Western Union money
transfer at the store’s customer service desk.197 On being informed by the
assistant manager, via phone, that the office computer could not be accessed
at the hour in question, the defendant “became belligerent.”198 This belligerence involved calling the assistant manager “[p]retty much every swear word
you can think of.”199 Shortly thereafter, the defendant arrived in person at the
closed customer service desk and began filling out a money transfer form.200
She then denied to the assistant manager that she had called earlier and directed a series of profane and personally and categorically abusive insults and
epithets at the assistant manager, “while gesticulating with her cane.”201 The
assistant manager “remained professional,”202 wishing the defendant-speaker
a “good night,” at which point the defendant left the store.203
On this basis, the Court in Baccala declared that “a contextual examination of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s remarks inexorably
leads to the conclusion that they were not likely to provoke a violent response
and, therefore, were not criminal in nature or form.”204
Whether a court chooses to take into consideration “the addressee’s age,
gender, and race,”205 or instead focuses on some “average store manager”206
in the addressee’s position, the answer to the court’s supposedly central inquiry seems reasonably clear. The likelihood of an on-duty assistant store
manager physically striking the verbal abuser in question was doubtlessly

196. Id. The traditional sentiment has been that fighting words cannot possibly take the form of
words spoken remotely over the telephone, or presumably, via social media, where the physical distance between the parties essentially imposes a “cooling-off” period before any physical altercation
can take place. See, e.g., State v. Dugan, 303 P.3d 755, 766 (Mont. 2013). Whatever the merits of
this approach with respect to the reactive violence prong of the fighting words doctrine, it seems especially doubtful in the context of social media and the “inflict injury” prong in particular. See Ashley
Barton, Note, Oh Snap!: Whether Snapchat Images Qualify as Fighting Words Under Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire and How To Address Americans’ Evolving Means of Communication, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1287, 1302–06 (2017).
197. Baccala, 163 A.3d at 4.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 4–5.
203. Id. at 5.
204. Id. at 7.
205. Id. at 8.
206. Id. at 13.
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low.207 What is less clear is the decisiveness, or even the relevance, of any
such inquiry.208
The Court in Baccala acknowledged that the defendant’s language was
“extremely offensive and meant to personally demean”209 their target and was
reprehensible, cruel, and “calculated to cause psychic harm.”210 But the target’s position as the responsible store manager, including her duty to model
deescalating and hostility-diffusive behavior; her authorized control over the
premises; and her advance knowledge of the defendant-speaker’s state of
mind all suggested a reduced likelihood of imminent violent retaliation.211
One might well wonder whether these sorts of considerations and judgments really carry no controversial normative element.212 But any such quibble would be beside the point. Even without these above considerations, we
can reasonably assume that no reactive violence was likely to be visited upon
the cane-waving defendant in this case, even if the cane-waving and the accompanying language could be construed as a technical assault.213
It seems fair to say that even if some technical misdemeanor could have
been charged in this case, the gravity of the offense would have been so minimal that as a matter of any reasonable set of discretionary priorities, the case
should have been dismissed.214 The defendant-speaker’s conduct was indeed
“an obvious expression of frustration at not being able to obtain services to
which she thought she was entitled.”215 And we certainly do not know anything of any possible backstory.216 In light of some possible inclusive backstory, perhaps the defendant’s frustration, in and of itself, was entirely understandable.

207. Id. at 14 (“Given the totality of the circumstances in the present case, . . . it would be unlikely
for an on duty store manager in Freeman’s position . . . to respond with a physical act of violence.”).
208. See id. (making this inquiry the crux of the Court’s fighting words analysis).
209. Id. at 13.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 14.
212. See id. at 20–21 (Eveleigh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted)
(asserting that a “post hoc analysis of the circumstances of the addressee will not accurately reflect
whether an ordinary person would reflexively respond with some degree of violence to a defendant’s
abusive language”).
213. For a bare-bones definition, see Assault, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910).
214. Baccala, A.3d at 16 (showing that the level of the harm from the incident did not even rise to
the level of fighting words, let alone actual assault).
215. Id. at 14.
216. See id. at 4 (beginning the discussion of the incident at the time the defendant’s verbal attack
on the telephone occurred).
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In any event, the obvious and extreme unlikelihood of any reactive violence in this case would be known largely from understanding the relevant
background conditions. Broad background probabilities and the importance
thereof are explored technically in Bayes’ Theorem.217 But such considerations hardly address the further question of freedom of speech, and of the values, costs, and limits thereof.218 In this case, the underlying message was
roughly that this particular speaker should have been able to have her Western
Union money transaction processed at this particular supermarket, on the particular day in question, as long as the speaker arrived before the supermarket’s
10:00 PM closing time.219 There was, apparently, no claim of any sort of invidious discrimination, or any other broad or systemically based objection, to
the denial or unavailability of this particular service.220
The case, thus, involves an essentially private or personal-level, if fervently held, grievance.221 The courts are not entirely clear on whether such
speech is entitled, in one context or another, to either no constitutional protection222 or else to only some minimal constitutional protection under the category of speech.223 For our purposes, we need not choose between these two
approaches. We can instead begin with Judge Richard Posner’s declaration
that “[t]he purpose of the free-speech clause . . . is to protect the market in
ideas, . . . broadly understood as the public expression of ideas, narratives,
concepts, imagery, opinions—scientific, political, or aesthetic—to an audience whom the speaker seeks to inform, edify, or entertain.”224
217. See James Joyce, Bayes’ Theorem, STAN. ENCYCOPEDIA OF PSYCH., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bayes-theorem/ (Sept. 30, 2003). That is, an approach to probability that relies heavily on the broad antecedent background likelihood or unlikelihood of a particular event. Id. If an
outcome is extremely rare in general across many relevant trials, that fact may dominate judgments as
to the likelihood of that outcome occurring in some particular single case. Id.
218. See Baccala, A.3d at 26 (Eveleigh, J., concurring).
219. See id. at 4.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. In the public employee discipline cases, see, e.g., Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 653 (2014)
(stating that “employee speech is unprotected if it is not a matter of public concern (or pursuant to an
employee’s job duties), but speech on matters of public concern may be restricted only if ‘the interest
of the state’ . . . outweighs ‘the interests of the [employee]’”); Engquist v. Oregon Department of
Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 600 (2008); and Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417–18 (2006).
223. See, e.g., Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 774 (1986) (libel case); Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (plurality opinion) (“In light
of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that the
state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages [in defamation cases]—
even absent a showing of ‘actual malice.’”); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
224. Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1250–51 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F.3d
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And then, with respect to the specific underlying free speech value of autonomous self-realization, consider the assessment of Professor Thomas Emerson: “[F]reedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual
self-fulfillment. The proper end of man is the realization of his character and
potentialities as a human being. For the achievement of this self-realization
the mind must be free.”225
The law, certainly, has no objection to the idea that a Western Union
transfer transaction should, under specified circumstances or in general, be
processed.226 The constitutional status of this idea, in itself, is again unclear.227
And it is particularly difficult to see what marginal value—in terms of a search
for truth, the promotion of democracy, or the pursuit of self-realization—is
added, distinctively, by the deeply offensive language alleged in the Baccala
case.228
It is technically possible to describe the gratuitously personally demeaning229 language alleged in Baccala as a contribution to some Posnerian collective pursuit of truth, or to democratic self-government, or to autonomous selffulfillment.230 But the more sensible approach to such expressions is to avoid
both idealized and overly restrictive understandings of these values on the one
hand231 and an unduly minimalist understanding of these values that trivializes
freedom of speech on the other.232 Even if we choose to find that deeply abusive alleged fighting words distinctively promote, valuably, the flourishing of
the speaker, we must ask as well whether the speech-related flourishing and
fulfillment of the target of the speech is thereby not at least equally impaired.233
Focusing on the purposes of freedom of speech and on the genuine, if
partly psychological, harms of exceptionally abusive speech of course cannot

878, 887 (7th Cir. 2003) (involving arguably harassing speech).
225. See EMERSON, supra note 42, at 6.
226. See State v. Baccala, 163 A.3d 1, 4 (Conn. 2017); supra notes 220–24 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
230. See Baccala, 163 A.3d at 4–5.
231. See, at least arguably, MILL, supra note 42, at 121 (seeking, ultimately, “the highest and most
harmonious development of [personal] powers to a complete and consistent whole”).
232. See generally Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 1994–2000, 48
UCLA L. REV. 1191, 1196–97 (2001) (noting that the views of Supreme Court Justices over the years
have ranged drastically, from “free speech maximalists” to free speech minimalists).
233. See generally Jim Hanson et al., The Fighting Words Doctrine: A History of Balancing Order
and Liberty, 44 WHITMAN COLL. 119 (2009).
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guarantee satisfactory outcomes in the fighting words cases.234 But attention
to the reasons for protecting speech, and to the nature and gravity of any
speech harms involved, can provide useful guidance.235 Consider, for example, the curious fighting words case of Anderson v. State.236
In this case, the defendant had hoped to have her son released on bond
after his DUI arrest, based on her personal check, rather than by providing a
cash bond.237 This arrangement proved unsatisfactory to the jail deputies, and
the defendant then remarked on the unlikelihood of the jail deputies retaining
their employment after the next election.238 The defendant was later informed
that her son would not be released on a cash bond until the defendant had
spoken with the local sheriff.239
The defendant located the sheriff at a local car dealership.240 The verbal
interaction between the two parties occurred while the defendant-speaker was
seated in her car, leaning across and speaking to the sheriff through her car’s
open window.241 The sheriff “asked her why she had been at the jail causing
trouble.”242 The sheriff testified that the defendant told him that, “[T]hey was
no good and that I was a no good son of a bitch and that she should get out of
the car and kick my ass.”243 The sheriff’s response was that “if she had to talk
that way, she could leave,” stating, “[I]f you don’t leave, I’m going to call and
have you removed.”244 The defendant replied, “Well, go ahead.”245 The sheriff testified that he “just went back to washing [his] car because [he] felt it
wasn’t even worth the trouble.”246 The defendant sat in her car for several
minutes and then said, “Well, I’ll see you on down the road,”247 and then drove

234. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 47, at 292–93 (noting a variety of different, imperfect means
to determine whether certain epithets are “fighting words”).
235. See Free Speech Justifications, supra note 45, 130–47.
236. 499 S.E.2d 717 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Golden Peanut Co. v.
Bass, 547 S.E.2d 637 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
237. See id. at 718–19.
238. See id. at 718.
239. See id. at 719.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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off.248
At trial, the sheriff testified that, “I really didn’t pay her that much attention,”249 but that “he was offended and disappointed”250 by the defendant’s
language and that he took seriously her verbal threat.251 On this basis, the
defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct in the form of fighting words,
and the conviction was, remarkably, upheld on appeal.252 The appellate court
did “not find that the words used by [the defendant] constituted protected
speech.”253 That the sheriff might be used to hearing similar language was not
decisive.254 The appellate court in Anderson held specifically that “the words
[the defendant] used were likely to provoke violence in the mind of the sheriff.
This was sufficient.”255
Anderson is, clearly, extreme in upholding a fighting words conviction
under exceptionally dubious facts.256 The likelihood of any immediate reactive violence by a sheriff against the person of the defendant seems doubtful
in the extreme, and in any case entirely within the discretion and control of
the sheriff himself. And the nature and gravity of any “inflict injury” prong
would seem to be more a matter of the sheriff’s subjective sense of proper
deference and decorum than of any genuine identity-based harm.257
The more defensible aspect of the Anderson case, though, focuses on the
reason for protecting, or not protecting, instances of speech in the first place.
In Anderson, the most relevant language by the defendant was to the effect
that the sheriff-addressee was “a no good son of a bitch,”258 and that the defendant herself should exit her car and “kick [the sheriff’s] ass.”259 We can,
if we wish, classify this speech in particular as a citizen critique of the job
248. See id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See id. The defendant testified that the sheriff had himself resorted to several profanities in
addressing the defendant during their encounter. See id.
252. See id. at 720.
253. Id.
254. Id. (citing Bolden v. State, 251 S.E.2d 165, 166 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978)) (stating that the sheriff’s
being used to hearing this type of language would not be a defense). But cf. Knowles v. State, 797
S.E.2d 197, 201–02 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017) (recognizing the cases holding trained police officers to a
higher standard in critical fighting words contexts); Trammel v. State, 851 S.E.2d 834, 837 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2020) (same).
255. Anderson, 499 S.E.2d at 720 (citing Georgia authority).
256. See id. at 719.
257. See id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
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performance of a public official.260 On this approach, the defendant’s speech
falls neatly within even the narrow core of protected speech.261
But it is also possible to ask whether the defendant’s admittedly quite
mild invective adds to, or detracts from, the free speech values of her underlying message as to police mishandling of the particular bond requirements in
connection with her son’s arrest, including any degree of emotional fervor in
expressing that underlying substantive message.262 The mild verbal abuse itself expressed by the defendant’s actual message did not detectably promote
the search for truth, democratic self-government, or self-realization263 above
and beyond a non-profane, non-threatening form of her message.264 And this
would be true not only in the Anderson case specifically, but in most even
loosely similar cases. In the Anderson case, what should have barred the conviction was not the value of the speech at issue but the de minimis character
of any threat of the defendant’s speech to the public order.265

260. See Free Speech Justifications, supra note 45, 141–42.
261. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (“[D]ebate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and . . . may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”).
262. See Anderson, 499 S.E.2d at 718–19.
263. See sources cited supra note 158; see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)
(“Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to
develop their faculties, and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.”), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam).
264. See Wright, Freedom of Speech as a Cultural Holdover, supra note 85, at 270; supra note 92
and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
It thus turns out that the fighting words doctrine, in general, is neither
obsolete nor in need of radical limitation. The traditionally neglected “inflict
injury” prong of the fighting words doctrine can and should be vitalized, with
only a minimal loss, if not an actual net gain, in promoting the basic purposes
of freedom of speech in the first place.266 And the “reactive violence” prong
can and should be relieved of its historic biases and dubious assumptions.267
On that basis, the reactive violence prong cases can be more thoughtfully and
realistically adjudicated.268
In all fighting words cases, judicial attention should be paid to the distinction between the abusive or provocative words actually used by the defendantspeaker and any underlying message, including the underlying message’s naturally associated emotional fervency.269 Protecting the latter, in undistorted
fashion, need not mean protecting the former.270 In most fighting words cases,
any tradeoff between the value of minimal discursive civility and the values
underlying freedom of undistorted speech need not be substantial.

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

See supra notes 112–21 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 105–12 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.
See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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